Reform of indirect taxation and
VA-based employers' contributions:
New Caledonia on its way to
a social VAT? by Lagadec, Gaël & Ris, Catherine
RefoRm of indiRect taxation and Va-based employeRs’ contRibutions:  
new caledonia on its way to a social Vat?
215
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university
The Government of New Caledonia is considering the adoption of a 
value added-based employers’ contribution—a so-called social value-
added tax (SVAT)—to pay for its social policy initiatives. This article 
examines the implications for business costs, inflation, imports, the 
purchasing power of wage earners, and taxes.
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The Government of New Caledonia, which 
was elected in May 2009, has decided to 
make changes to social policy, including 
increasing basic incomes, regulating prices of 
essential products, regulating bank charges, 
and providing assistance to underprivileged 
parts of the population as well as to 
the middle class (housing support and 
pensions). Economic policy has also been 
revamped to improve competitiveness. This 
competition policy is complemented with 
a higher purchasing power policy, since it 
implies reductions in firms’ production costs 
to offset the effects of wage increases. The 
competition policy is based partially on the 
reform of the New Caledonian tax system, 
which should be implemented in the second 
part of the government’s 2009–14 term 
(following an aborted attempt to reform the 
tax regime in 2007).
In order to ease the implementation 
of the new social policy, the president has 
announced that he is studying the possibility 
of a value-added (VA) employers’ tax 
contribution to help pay for the social 
policy initiatives—implying a transfer of 
the tax base from wages to value added. 
The government is also planning tax 
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reform that could result in either a value-
added tax (VAT) or a simplified customs 
tax. Whatever the reform, a VA-based 
employers’ contribution is an innovative 
measure—essentially a social VAT (as 
opposed to a ‘fiscal’ VAT).
What is at stake in these reforms 
is avoiding a social stalemate such as 
Guadeloupe (a French overseas department) 
had to undergo in 2009, with the unions 
thinking a wage increase was vital and 
employers considering it unsustainable 
(Lagadec 2009).
This article presents the concept of a 
social VAT and shows how adopting it in 
New Caledonia (whether together with 
a traditional VAT or not) could allow the 
government to gain manoeuvring room 
for a boost in purchasing power without 
undermining firms’ competitiveness.
Economic overview of New 
Caledonia
Key economic indicators
Together with French Polynesia and Wallis 
and Futuna, New Caledonia is one of three 
French Pacific territories. It enjoys a unique 
constitutional arrangement, laid out in the 
Accord de Nouméa and signed in 1998, 
which sets out a process for France to hand 
over responsibility for sectors other than 
defence, foreign policy, justice, public order, 
and money; and with the possibility of a 
referendum on independence during the 
2014–18 period.
New Caledonia has one of the largest 
economies in the Pacific islands region, 
with a relatively high GDP per capita 
(comparable with New Zealand; Table 1); 
however, there are significant disparities 
in income distribution (both geographically 
and ethnically). Although New Caledonia 
has significant nickel resources, which 
account for 90 per cent of its export earnings, 
it is still reliant on financial transfers from 
Table 1 Main economic indicators of New Caledonia, 2009
New Caledonia
Population 245,580
Human Development Index 0.878
Gini index (2004) 50
Per capita GDP (€) 24,900
Adjusted annual GDP growth rate (%) 1.81
Inflation (%) 3.4
Unemployment rate (2004) (%) 16.3
Exports/imports cover rate (%) 36.02
Transfers from state (€ billion) 1.14
Minimum guaranteed wage (€/month) 1,042.5
Source: Lagadec, G. and Ris, C., 2010. La conjoncture économique dans la région Asie-Pacifique après la crise des 
subprime, MPRA Paper no. 23304.
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France amounting to approximately 25 per 
cent of GDP.
New Caledonia is unique in being a South 
Pacific economy based predominately on 
mining,3 and it has some quite sophisticated 
domestic industries and services to support 
the mining sector. Despite the substantial 
fall in world nickel prices in 2008–09, with 
several large mining infrastructure projects in 
the pipeline, the nickel industry will become 
even more important to New Caledonia’s 
economy—significantly increasing its 
contribution to GDP and generating further 
employment opportunities in the longer 
term. Nickel’s price volatility, however, 
means there is an obvious need to reduce 
economic uncertainty through economic 
diversification.
New Caledonia’s economic growth over 
the past 10 years has been accompanied 
by a decline in the importance of the 
public sector (Sudrie 2009). Further, the 
growth of government revenue has reduced 
the dependence of public finances on 
metropolitan transfers and has permitted 
financing of public spending without 
increasing public debt (which remains 
low). Nevertheless, public finances have 
some structural weakness: revenue is linked 
partly to the fluctuations in the nickel 
price, whereas the recent increase in public 
spending is mostly structural (CEROM 
2008).
The main indicators of foreign trade
New Caledonia’s trade openness ratio4 
increased between 1998 (18 per cent) and 
2009 (41 per cent), but it remains low 
compared with that prevailing in other 
small island states. Indeed, according to 
CEROM (2008), only 13 per cent of the small 
island states have a trade openness ratio as 
low as New Caledonia’s.
New Caledonia applies trade barriers 
to protect local industry and employment5 
(although a preferential tariff regime for 
the entry of EU-origin products remains 
in place). But the protection given to 
domestic industry does not provide a full 
explanation of the low openness ratio 
(Figure 1 shows that the protectionist 
policy has not succeeded in curbing the 
volume of imports). The New Caledonian 
openness ratio might be biased downwards 
because the protectionist policy6 and small 
market size have had the effect of driving 
up domestic prices compared with import 
prices—with the denominator of this ratio 
being overvalued by 72 per cent at world 
prices7 (Brard 2007).
New Caledonia consistently runs a trade 
deficit (Figure 1). The propensity to export 
is limited, with the exception of nickel. New 
Caledonian exports are modest because 
of the territory’s overwhelming reliance 
on mineral exports and because local 
production costs are high. These similarities 
with the other main French territory in 
the Pacific (French Polynesia) have been 
underlined by Poirine (2010).
Social inequalities
New Caledonian society has a high level 
of inequality. The wealthiest households 
(approximately 20 per cent of the population, 
or 15,000 tax households) receive 55 per 
cent of all the revenue declared to the tax 
administration, compared with 40 per 
cent in Metropolitan France, 41 per cent in 
Australia, and 43 per cent in New Zealand 
(CEROM 2008:45).
In 2006, the Gini index calculated for 
New Caledonia was 50. France has a Gini 
index of 33; for Australia and New Zealand, 
the Gini index is 35.8 This significant 
disparity in wealth distribution is made 
more painful for some by the high cost 
of living owing to small market size and 
heavy market protection (favouring local 
and European goods).
In 2006, two-thirds of private-sector 
employment was paid less than CFP200,0009 
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(€1,680). The share of salaried workers in the 
private sector who are paid the minimum 
wage or less is 37 per cent in New Caledonia 
(New Caledonian Public Health Insurance 
and Family Benefit Fund: www.cafat.nc) 
compared with 14 per cent in Metropolitan 
France. The minimum wage in New Caledonia 
(CFP132,000, €1,109 in January 2010) equals 
70 per cent of the metropolitan minimum 
guaranteed salary, while salaried agricultural 
workers are paid the agricultural minimum 
guaranteed salary, which corresponds legally 
to 85 per cent of the minimum guaranteed 
salary—with prices in New Caledonia 
being considerably higher than in European 
countries (CEROM 2008:59).
Moreover, the high inflation rate in 
recent years was even harsher for the 
poorest households as increases in food 
prices were much higher than for other 
goods. The strong inflationary pressure 
encouraged the government to establish 
a freeze on prices and sales margins for 
imported goods, local products and some 
services. A limited number of products and 
services are still regulated in New Caledonia; 
this is the case for essential or basic necessity 
products in particular. Inequalities in New 
Caledonia correspond acutely with the lack 
of purchasing power for those on the lowest 
salaries. This justifies the recent policy of 
wage increases.
The Government of New Caledonia has 
a variety of mechanisms at its disposal to 
regulate the economy in terms of economic 
legislation and taxation, while monetary 
policy is the responsibility of the French State. 
In this context, reforms to redistribute income 
and increase purchasing power appear to 
be a prerequisite for stronger and sustained 
growth.
Figure 1 Evolution of New Caledonia’s foreign trade
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Source: New Caledonia Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies: http://www.isee.nc/seriesstat/seriesstats.
html; New Caledonia Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (ISEE), 2010. Tableaux de l’économie calédonienne, 
Edition abrégée 2009, New Caledonia Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, Noumea:96 
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An outline of New Caledonia’s tax 
system
Relative parts of direct and indirect 
taxation. New Caledonia’s budget is first and 
foremost a budget of income redistribution 
between the ‘collectivities’, among which the 
three provinces come first. This ‘rebalancing’ 
was planned by the Accord de Nouméa and 
the 1999 organic law, which confirmed New 
Caledonia’s institutional specificity. In 2007, 
New Caledonia received total revenue of 
CFP152 billion, CFP141 billion of which 
came from taxation. There are two main 
categories of revenue: that pertaining to 
the base of redistribution to collectivities 
(territory, provinces, and municipalities), 
including direct and indirect taxes; and 
that directly allocated by New Caledonia 
to some establishments and various bodies 
(notably the New Caledonian Public Health 
Insurance and Family Benefit Fund, or 
CAFAT, which manages social security).
From 2002 to 2007, tax revenue increased 
from CFP74 billion to CFP141 billion (an 89 
per cent increase). Since 2007, tax revenue 
has plateaued as a result of the economic 
crisis and the sharp fall of the international 
nickel price.
The share of the general import tax 
(the main customs tax in New Caledonia), 
which until 2006 was New Caledonia’s 
main revenue earner, fell by two-thirds in 
2007 due to the exceptional yield of the tax 
on firms (due to the large increase in the 
nickel price). Five taxes shared between 
them nearly 60 per cent of total product and 
customs revenues, representing 21 per cent 
of total revenue (which reached a minimum 
in 2007)
IS 35 (tax on mining and metallurgical •	
firms): 18 per cent
IS (tax on firms): 13 per cent•	
TGI (general import tax): 11 per cent•	
IR (income tax): 9 per cent•	
TSS (solidarity tax on services): 8 per •	
cent.
Consequently, from 2006 onwards there 
was a significant inversion of the yields 
of direct and indirect taxation, which the 
Chambre Territoriale des Comptes de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie (CTC 2008:9) sheds 
light on. Direct taxation—traditionally the 
lesser source—overtook indirect taxation 
in 2006 (Figure 2). The crossing of the 
curves is good in terms of social justice, as 
redistribution by tax depends mainly on 
direct taxation (with income taxation being 
progressive).
New Caledonia’s tax and customs 
competence.  New Caledonia’s  tax 
autonomy, which has existed since 1900, 
allows for taxation that differs from that 
of Metropolitan France. Thus, reform of 
New Caledonia’s tax regime could lead to 
solutions unprecedented in Metropolitan 
France (for a description of various policy 
experiments that have taken place in France, 
see Laroque and Salanié 2002:25–48).
The increasing importance of reform 
stems from the current system being the 
fruit of ‘historic sedimentation’, according 
to the CTC (2008:6): the number of taxes has 
grown over time and the exemptions have 
multiplied. The exemptions have turned 
New Caledonia’s customs taxation into a 
complex system with little efficiency.
The previous  New Caledonian 
government (elected in 2004) launched 
a large reform of indirect taxation. The 
objectives of this reform were to replace 
most of the customs duties with a VAT. But 
this reform met strong resistance from the 
industries threatened by imports and the 
reform was aborted in 2007. The new reform 
is intended to be prepared from 2011 with 
the objective of enforcement before 2014 
(when the next elections will be held).
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Shifting the taxation of 
employers’ contributions to a new 
base
A VAT is now found in more than 130 
countries (raising about 20 per cent of 
the world’s tax revenue) and has been 
the centrepiece of tax reform in many 
developing countries. Most countries that 
have adopted a VAT seem to have gained 
a more effective tax instrument in doing so 
(Keen and Lockwood 2010:138–51). While 
the VAT and the goods and services tax 
(GST) have been a part of the tax landscape 
in Europe for the past 50 years, they have 
been widely adopted in the Asia Pacific 
region only in the past 10 to 20 years.10 
As for the social value-added tax (SVAT), 
references in English are rare. Indeed, only 
a few countries have established a SVAT 
mechanism.
The principles of contributions transfer
The fiscal VAT and social VAT are 
undifferentiated at the collection level. 
It is where the taxes are directed that the 
distinction appears, as the ‘social’ VAT 
contributes to the welfare system while the 
‘fiscal’ VAT goes into general revenue (for a 
discussion of taxes paid by employers and 
employees, see Picard and Toulemonde 
2001:461–70).
Replacing employers’ contributions 
with a social VAT is not neutral. The SVAT 
is passed fully on to the consumer; it has 
no bearing on the firms’ costs. This is not 
Figure 2 Revenue from direct and indirect taxes since 2002 (CFP billion)
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html; New Caledonia Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (ISEE), 2010. Tableaux de l’économie calédonienne, 
Edition abrégée 2009, New Caledonia Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, Noumea:104
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the case, however, for the employers’ social 
contributions on wages, which can be only 
partially passed on to the consumer or 
employees.11 This is not equivalent in terms 
of the distribution of the tax burden between 
employers and consumers: consumers will 
pay higher prices for local and imported 
goods and services, and employers will have 
lower labour costs after removal of the ‘tax 
wedge’ on wages (part of the cost of social 
protection being passed from producers to 
consumers). This change justifies the fact 
that such a reform should go along with 
the social policy of increasing salaries (see 
above). 
The calculation and collection of the 
SVAT are similar to those for the normal VAT: 
they apply to all goods sold domestically 
and do not apply to exports. Export prices 
are ‘non-SVAT’ and prices on the domestic 
market are SVAT inclusive. Herein lies the 
interest in the social contributions transfer 
mechanism, which would entail two gains
reducing export prices by suppressing •	
contributions (hence an increase in 
competitiveness)
increasing imported products’ prices by •	
adding a SVAT to the VAT (protection of 
the domestic market).
Establishing such a mechanism would 
reduce firms’ costs (the wage increase being 
balanced by social contributions deducted 
from costs).
Such a mechanism has been devised 
by the Government of New Caledonia 
elected in May 2009. This initiative is doubly 
innovative as
New Caledonia has not adopted a VAT •	
and relies for an important part of its 
fiscal revenue on customs duty,12 which 
is also the case for many small island 
states in the Pacific (Cook Islands, Fiji,13 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and 
Vanuatu; see Appendix 1)
few countries have adopted a SVAT. In •	
1987, Denmark achieved tax reform that 
entailed the suppression (between 1987 
and 1989) of the social contributions 
made by employers. The deficit in 
public finances was made up by a 22–25 
per cent increase in the VAT. In France, 
the 1994 Perben Act established such a 
mechanism in La Reunion, Guadeloupe 
and Martinique. More recently, Germany 
introduced a SVAT on 1 July 2007 (for a 
presentation on the introduction of the 
SVAT in Denmark and Germany, see 
Besson 2007).
Gains expected from a SVAT
The advantages of a SVAT can be divided 
into four categories.
1. Fighting firms’ relocation 
by reducing labour costs and boosting •	
employment, which should lead to a 
reduction in ‘moonlighting’ (Memon 
2010)
by suppressing tax-related distortions •	
in production costs between goods 
manufactured locally or imported; 
this means that a SVAT would apply 
to domestic products as well as to 
imported goods. In contrast, employers’ 
contributions to welfare could be 
seen as a discriminatory tax hitting 
domestic production and exempting 
foreign production. Thus, domestic 
goods are disadvantaged at export and 
the imports in competition with them 
on the domestic market are given an 
advantage. In this way, the traditional 
VAT system can be seen as an ‘inverted 
customs duty’.
2. Improving the purchasing power of 
employees
with employers’ contributions being •	
replaced by a SVAT, labour costs would 
diminish; consequently, the increase in 
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net wages after removing the tax wedge 
would be less than the former wage 
tax; the net equilibrium wage would 
increase and the net labour cost paid by 
employers would decline. The magnitude 
of this effect would depend on the price 
elasticity of labour demand.
3. Reducing the public deficit 
by applying the SVAT to civil servants’ •	
pensions; as a consequence, civil service 
pensions would no longer be financed 
by the State
by making foreign producers contribute •	
to social protection.
4. Promoting a trade surplus
by reducing the prices of exports (sold •	
non-inclusive of VAT and SVAT)
by increasing the prices of imported •	
goods.
The last three advantages (purchasing 
power, public deficit, and trade surplus) 
seem to be the most important in the case 
of New Caledonia.
Overall, a SVAT should improve 
competitiveness without reducing demand, 
which should fuel growth and employment. 
The increase in competitiveness also boosts 
purchasing power—the reason being that 
as employers’ contributions have been 
removed from production costs, increasing 
salaries would be less penalising for firms. 
Thus, a SVAT allows for more room to 
manoeuvre for a resolute policy to improve 
purchasing power.
The  quant i ta t ive  and dynamic 
consequences of a SVAT reform have been 
analysed by Fève, Matheron and Sahuc 
(2009) using two general equilibrium 
models. They show that the fiscal reform 
generates a small, positive, long-run effect 
and yields a modest welfare gain.
Furthermore, implementing a SVAT 
would considerably simplify the current 
tax system in New Caledonia. As outlined 
by Bird (2004), one of the most important 
lessons emerging from experience in various 
countries is that an essential precondition 
for the reform of tax administration is to 
simplify the tax system to ensure that it 
can be applied effectively (Grandcolas 2005 
illustrates some complementary conditions 
of success of the VAT in the Pacific).
The economic difficulties expected from 
a SVAT
Fiscal equity. The system of social 
contributions is progressive whereas a 
VAT is regressive. The question of equity 
becomes vital when one focuses on the 
central issue (substituting a SVAT for 
contributions), since the increase in VAT 
rates would apply to individuals who are 
not directly concerned with the decline in 
contributions. For instance, Gibson (1998) 
shows how Papua New Guinea’s VAT 
impacts on consumer welfare, and which 
items should be exempt from the VAT on the 
grounds of equity and poverty alleviation.
Equity considerations must be balanced 
against efficiency considerations; however, 
in this case, equity is not a major problem. 
On this issue, see Mankiw, Weinzierl 
and Yagan (2009), who show clearly that 
from a theoretical point of view optimal 
taxation would entail regressive taxation 
of high wages (the efficiency of stimulating 
savings outweighing a highly inequitable 
modality).
Inflation. There would be a real 
inflation risk from a SVAT if the tax were 
substituted for employers’ contributions 
(not employees’ contributions) and only if 
the firms did not translate the lower-paid 
employers’ contributions into their selling 
prices. If one makes the assumption of non-
zero elasticities of supply and demand, a fall 
in labour costs will not be passed fully on to 
consumers through lower (excluding VAT) 
prices. It means that price inflation (VAT 
included) cannot be avoided.
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A SVAT as a tool to boost wages?
Gaining manoeuvring room by changing 
the tax base of social contributions
New Caledonia, like many small island 
states, is faced with the problem of high 
living costs (UNESCAP 2009:112). To 
counter this, the immediate solution might 
appear to be an increase in wages. But such 
a measure would meet with important 
difficulties.
In the private sector (where average 1. 
wages are lower than those of civil 
servants) there could be no direct action 
except on the minimum wage (which is 
currently being done).
Increas ing the  minimum wage 2. 
might entail a narrowing of wage 
differentials.
Increasing minimum wages would 3. 
entail difficulties for firms.
Conversely, with an increase in wages 
accompanying the establishment of a 
SVAT, it would be possible to improve 
purchasing power without weighing on 
the firms’ contributions (Figure 3). Note 
that Figure 3 considers a SVAT replacing 
the employers’ contributions, not the 
employees’ contributions (in the latter case, 
an increase in purchasing power would 
be automatic). As the New Caledonian 
government has decided to increase the 
minimum guaranteed wage in many steps 
from 2010, the question is how to countervail 
the increase in firms’ production costs.
As long as the wage increase did not 
exceed the amount of the contributions 
‘saved’  in this  fashion,  the f irms’ 
contributions would not increase as a 
consequence of the reform.
As well as the direct advantages of an 
increase in purchasing power and stability 
of the contributions, such a policy would 
have a number of indirect advantages
financing of social contributions would 1. 
apply on a very wide base and would 
be less painful
firms would benefit from a classic VAT 2. 
(with more flexibility and more cash 
flow for enterprises, which should boost 
the economy)
Figure 3 SVAT with wage increase
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in a reform in which a fiscal VAT plus 3. 
a social VAT would substitute for 
customs duty, the protection of firms 
in competition with imports would be 
higher than with a simple VAT; VAT and 
social VAT also apply to imports.14
Illustration: a didactic example
Simulating the adoption of a SVAT 
appears to be a difficult task, as Malinvaud 
(1998:40) argues: 
Let’s suppose an undifferentiated 
diminution of  the employers’ 
contributions rate is established 
simultaneously with a compensatory 
increase of the VAT rate. This decision 
should immediately trigger a whole 
set of reactions, either simultaneous 
or  chain react ions.  They wil l 
concern prices without VAT and 
with VAT included, costs, transfers, 
anticipations. Keeping precise track 
of this set of reactions would imply 
a deep knowledge of the forms of 
competition, of how wages decisions 
are made, of the inflexibility of prices 
and salaries, of how transfer revisions 
are regulated. All the more so as 
situations vary from one good to the 
next, one transfer to the other and 
as the context where these multiple 
reactions will occur will itself be 
influenced by these reactions, notably 
if there are favourable effects in terms 
of employment. As we don’t possess 
this deep knowledge required for a 
precise follow-up beyond a few terms, 
we must rely on our judgement and 
schematize by paying attention to 
relative prices and costs as much as 
to effects of volume.
To make it easier to understand the 
mechanism envisaged, we illustrate it 
here with two examples: 1) products 
manufactured in New Caledonia; and 2) 
imported goods (both with a VAT and 
with a SVAT). We indicate the rates of the 
employees’ and employers’ contributions 
in each case (Table 2).
Table 2 Tax contributions, as of 1 January 2010 (per cent)
Risk Employers Salaried 
workers
Total Monthly base 
(CFP)
Illness 11.30 3.85 15.15 0–399,100
Old-age pension 9.80 4.20 14.0 0–306,500
Family benefits 6.14 - 6.14 0–306,500
Unemployment 1.52 0.34 1.86 0–306,500
Industrial injury 0.72–6.48 - 0.72–6.48 0–306,500
Housing social fund 2.0 - 2.0 0–258,800
Vocational training 0.25 - 0.25 0–306,500
Total of social contributions 31.73 8.39 40.12
Inhouse training 0.70 - 0.70 Whole salary
Exceptional contribution for 
solidarity
- 0.75 0.75 On the part 
of salary over 
306,500
- zero 
Source: New Caledonian Public Health Insurance and Family Benefit Fund: www.cafat.nc.
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We make some simple assumptions 
according to the industry and to the 
production costs of imports. We normalise 
at 100 both the retail prices of the local 
products and the imported products. We 
consider a 20 per cent average customs duty 
for industry (which is close to the average 
tariff rate; see DRD 2010) and a 25 per cent 
rate for imports (the difference being due to 
the tariff exemptions for industry inputs). 
We consider equipment depreciation to be 
30 per cent of the cost of raw materials and 
inputs for local industry and 15 per cent 
for the import sector;15 and we consider 
wages to represent 140 per cent of this cost 
for industry and 70 per cent for imports. 
The customs duty rates are 5.5 and 10 
per cent, respectively, while employers’ 
contribution rates are 12.3 and 8.8 per cent, 
respectively.16
We then assume an 8 per cent profit rate 
and apply a VAT rate substituting for tariffs in 
order to maintain approximately the same level 
of revenue, and we do the same for a SVAT, 
substituting for employers’ contributions. 
This results in an 8 per cent fiscal VAT rate17 
and a 15 per cent SVAT rate.18
This example illustrates
the current situation1. 
the situation of a VAT substituting for 2. 
customs duty (at the very least with 
constant revenue)
a VAT substituting for customs duties 3. 
and a SVAT substituting for employers’ 
contributions
Table 3 Example of a SVAT with a wage increase in New Caledonia
Current VAT SVAT (*) SVAT + 10%  W
Industry Import Industry Import Industry Import Industry Import
Raw materials, inputs, 
without tax 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7
Products 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9
Customs duty 5.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equipment depreciation 8.3 6.0 8.3 6.0 8.3 6.0 8.3 6.0
Wages without employer’s 
contributions 38.8 27.9 38.8 27.9 38.8 27.9 42.6 30.7
Employer’s contributions to the 
social security 12.3 8.8 12.3 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Profit before tax 7.4 7.4 7.0 6.6 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.1
Selling price without any VAT n.a. n.a. 94.0 89.2 80.7 79.7 84.9 82.7
VAT collected 0.0 0.0 7.5 7.1 6.5 6.4 6.8 6.6
SVAT collected 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 12.0 12.7 12.4
Selling price inclusive of tax 100.0 100.0 101.54 96.4 99.3 98.0 104.5 101.7
Variation of the tax revenue 11.1% -15.0% 4.2% -2.6% 3.8% 1.1%
Variation of the price inclusive 
of tax 1.5% -3.6% -0.7% -2.0% 4.5% 1.7%
Variation of real salary (according to industry/import prices) 5.5% 8.3%
n.a. not applicable 
(*) Fiscal VAT plus social VAT 
Source: Author’s calculations
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a VAT substituting for customs duties 4. 
and a SVAT accompanied by a 10 per 
cent wage increase.
We illustrate the effects of a SVAT 
accompanied by a wage increase on domestic 
industry and on imports (the wages share in 
the price differs widely as well as the effects 
of taxation change) (Table 3). The SVAT 
consists of the replacement of employers’ 
contributions with a VAT plus a fiscal VAT.
The example shows that the selling 
price to the Caledonian consumer could be 
left unchanged,19 with the VAT and SVAT 
correctly calibrated, and the economy as a 
whole enjoying the advantages of a SVAT 
(or simply a VAT). As for imported goods, 
prices would be increased by the VAT or 
the SVAT by 23 per cent.20 Yet the situations 
for the local industry and for imports 
differ. Should there be a shift to a VAT, the 
prices of domestic goods would increase 
whereas the prices of imports would fall. 
This difference is linked to the customs 
basis—initially smaller for industry (than 
for imports) because of important customs 
tax exemptions for this sector.
Should a SVAT be adopted, industry 
would enjoy a greater gain than the import 
sector because of the larger basis for employers’ 
contributions (wages), which would be 
transferred to the value added. If we consider 
a fiscal and a social VAT (columns 6 and 7), 
both the industry and the import sector would 
experience a price decrease.
If one compares columns 2 and 3 
(current situation) with columns 8 and 9, 
gross salaries would increase by 10 per 
cent and prices inclusive of tax by 4.5 per 
cent in the case of industry and by 1.7 per 
cent in the case of imports. Thus, industry 
would be penalised in comparison with 
imports because of the lower customs duty 
on inputs when a VAT would not a priori 
offer the same flexibility. Yet, conversely, a 
SVAT (more precisely a dual system of fiscal 
and social VATs) would offer compensation 
in terms of market protection in comparison 
with what a simple fiscal VAT would do (since 
the VAT rates would apply to the imports in 
competition with the local production). If some 
goods required further transitory protection, 
specific protection might be used.
Depending on whether one makes 
calculations in relation to the prices of 
industrial goods locally transformed or in 
relation to import prices, the real gross salary 
would increase by 5.5 or 8.3 per cent. Thus, 
a positive impact on purchasing power is 
made possible without penalising firms, 
which, to the contrary, would benefit from 
the increase in demand thus created. This 
highlights the irrelevance of the argument 
that New Caledonian economic policies 
under consideration, including the wage 
increase, would increase prices.
Another argument must be taken into 
account concerning purchasing power. In the 
above example, the SVAT columns assume 
there is no increase in the gross wage rate 
(before social contributions/wage tax) after 
the wage tax is replaced with a SVAT. But 
if we consider non-zero elasticities for the 
supply and demand of labour, we can show 
in a simple partial equilibrium framework 
that the labour demand curve (as a function 
of the wage rate before social contributions) 
shifts to the right because the wage tax on 
employers is removed; this increases the 
equilibrium quantity of labour supplied and 
demanded, the equilibrium wage rate, and 
the total surplus (welfare gain).
To illustrate this point, if we were 
to consider a 5 per cent increase in the 
equilibrium wage rate, the above analysis 
would result in a 3.1 per cent increase of the 
real wage compared with the prices in the 
industry sector (5.1 per cent in comparison 
with imports)—without considering any 
implementation of a VAT or a SVAT.
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Conclusion
While the VAT system has spread to most 
countries, an important proportion of small 
island states has not adopted this fiscal 
tool. In New Caledonia, reform of indirect 
taxation launched in 2004 was aborted a few 
years later (CTC 2008:53). Tradespeople and 
entrepreneurs (that is, the people to be in 
charge of collecting the tax) were strongly 
resistant to the introduction of a VAT, mainly 
because it would mean less tariff protection 
for domestic production. Other issues could 
also help explain why the VAT has not been 
a popular fiscal revenue tool in some small 
island states: the risk that substituting a VAT 
for customs duty could entail an inflation 
shock (due to fixing margins in absolute values 
in economies with little competitiveness rather 
than in percentage terms), and with a VAT 
later applied to this margin, contrary to what 
happens with customs duty. The traditional 
argument that the VAT is neutral with respect 
to resource allocation is hardly relevant in 
an economy whose sectors include very few 
processing stages.
New Caledonia and other small island 
states could, however, have a major interest in 
this tool by going beyond the traditional use 
of a VAT. By including the financing of social 
contributions in this tax (social contributions 
would be transferred from labour to value 
added—that is, to consumption, because of 
the deductibility principle of the VAT system), 
there would be an improvement in export 
competitiveness and increased protection 
from imports (in comparison with shifting to 
a traditional VAT). Furthermore, the transfer 
of contributions would permit a wage increase 
without lessening firms’ competitiveness; this 
would create opportunities to boost purchasing 
power (and consequently to increase the 
demand for domestically produced output).
The New Caledonian government 
is studying such a transfer system with 
respect to employers’ contributions. But 
in order to boost purchasing power, it 
could be more useful to manage with the 
transfer of employees’ contributions. Should 
the taxation of employees’ contributions 
be added to the SVAT mechanism, the 
impact on purchasing power would be 
reinforced.21
Whether employers’ contributions or 
employees’ contributions are transferred, 
there should be no need for this reform to 
be brutal. A VAT could be established while 
maintaining employers’ contributions; the 
transfer of these contributions to a SVAT 
could be done gradually by reducing the 
employers’ contributions and increasing 
VAT rates at the same time.
Having a progressive agenda would 
comply with Grandcolas’s (2004:22) 
recommendations to ensure the success 
of fiscal reform: ‘in administrative terms, 
establishing VAT in the Pacific island 
countries is possible should some conditions 
be met. First a strong and explicit motivation 
at the head of the state is needed; next 
preparing a detailed plan of implementation 
with realistic dates for the major steps is 
required.’ 
The government’s intention to carry 
out fiscal reform and a real wage increase 
seems real (Gomès 2009). What remains is to 
determine the best way to meet the different 
objectives without adversely affecting the 
economy’s competitiveness.
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Notes
1 6.2 per cent in 2007.
2 75 per cent in 2007.
3  New Caledonia has a long-established nickel 
industry, with more than 25 per cent of the 
world’s known nickel resources.
4 Exports plus imports as a proportion of 
GDP.
5 In 2009, the New Caledonian average customs 
duty was 18.83 per cent (DRD 2010).
6 For an analysis of the macroeconomic 
consequences of protectionism for a small 
island state, see Poirine (2007:26).
7 Another reason for the overvaluation of GDP 
in New Caledonia is the 73 per cent higher 
wages of state public servants compared with 
those in Metropolitan France.
8 The most egalitarian countries have a Gini 
coefficient of about 25 (Japan, Norway). 
The least egalitarian countries (Brazil, South 
Africa, Haiti and Botswana) have a coefficient 
of approximately 60.
9 The three French Pacific territories share a 
common currency—the French Pacific franc 
(CFP)—whose current parity of CFP119.2 to €1 
has been fixed by the French government.
10 VAT was introduced in French Polynesia in 1998 
to replace import duties, without inflationary 
consequences.
11 Depending on the price elasticities of labour 
supply and labour demand, and on the price 
elasticity of supply and demand for the product 
sold.
12 Depending on the year, customs duty represents 
between 20 and 25 per cent of the fiscal revenue 
of New Caledonia (ISEE 2010:97, 101). See also 
CTC (2008:23–4).
13 Narayan and Prasad (2003:5–26) examine 
issues arising from a 25 per cent increase in 
the VAT in Fiji in 2003.
14 For this reason, the industries threatened by 
imports have shown a preference for a SVAT 
in addition to the traditional VAT: ‘It seems 
that a fiscal reform occurs every 50 years. 
So this is a unique opportunity, a vast work, 
in which one can see the emergence of the 
VAT, which is a tax that will be paid by all 
New Caledonians. The possibility of a social 
VAT, which favours the competitiveness of 
domestic firms in comparison to their foreign 
competitors, is also considered’ (MADE IN 
2006).
15 The assumed values for wages and 
depreciation in relation to raw materials 
(local industry) and of products (imports) 
were determined after consulting the former 
president of the Federation of Industries 
of New Caledonia as well as the former 
president of the Tradespeople’s Union of 
New Caledonia.
16 133.3 × 31.7 per cent and 66.7 × 31.7 per cent 
(percentage of employers’ contributions for 
New Caledonia; see Table 2).
17 This rate would compensate for the loss of 
customs revenue (although the situations of 
industry and imports differ: the imported 
good being cheaper, the VAT applied would 
be lower in absolute value with the same tax 
rate). Besides, it is in conformity with the rate 
planned in the aborted 2007 reform (CTC 
2008:54). See Table 3.
18 This would compensate for the loss of the 
employers’ contributions (see Table 3).
19 The impact on prices would depend, for 
each sector, on the part of salaries in the 
production cost. The higher this part, the 
more the selling cost inclusive of tax would 
decline due to the SVAT substituting for 
employer contributions. Therefore, prices 
would decline in certain sectors and increase 
in others. At the economy-wide level, the 
effect on prices would be neutral.
20 Although the example in Table 2 is only 
illustrative, it is likely that 23 per cent is 
close to what would prevail should the SVAT 
support all social security expenditures. 
Indeed, in 2006, the Government of New 
Caledonia was planning to replace CFP36 
billion of fiscal revenue with a VAT rate of 
about 8 per cent. Social contributions amount 
to approximately CFP65 billion (industrial 
injury, unemployment, family benefits, and 
illness). This adds up to about CFP100 billion, 
which would correspond with an 8 per cent 
‘global’ VAT (fiscal VAT plus social VAT).
21 The inflation effect would be greater in this 
case, since the part of the social VAT that 
would replace the employees’ contributions 
would not be partially offset by a lower 
labour cost for employers; but the increase in 
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real wages would be greater than in the case 
of employers’ contributions since employees’ 
contributions would be directly transferred 
to employees. 
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Public revenue in Pacific countries
Population HDI Total 
revenue 
& grants/
GDP (%)
Average 
tariff rate 
(%)
VAT VAT 
rate (%)
Customs 
revenue/
total 
revenue 
& grants 
(%)
VAT 
revenue/
total 
revenues 
& grants 
(%)
Australia 20,743,000 0.962 36.0 5.3 Yes 10.0 2.1 15.9
Cook Islands 18,900 .. 34.2 7.0 Yes 12.5 11.2 31.9
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia
111,000 0.569 59.1 4.2 No n.a. 6.4 n.a.
Fiji 839,000 0.762 24,1 15.6 Yes 12.5 16.4 31.4
Kiribati 95,000 0.515 90.9 17.2 No n.a. 13.6 n.a.
New 
Caledonia 250,000 0.878 39.9 (*) 18.8 No n.a. 14.8 (*) n.a.
New 
Zealand 4,180,000 0.943 36.0 3.2 Yes 12.5 3.2 29.5
Niue 2,200 .. 90 No n.a. 21.4 n.a.
Palau 20,000 0.861 27.6 3.02 No n.a. 6.7 n.a.
Papua New 
Guinea 6,330,000 0.53 36.1 32.1 (**) Yes 10.0 5.5 8.3
Republic 
of Marshall 
Islands
59,000 0.563 65.2 9 No n.a. 7.6 n.a.
Samoa 187,000 0.785 32.5 7 Yes 12.5 - 15 9.4 23.1
Solomon 
Islands 500,000 0.602 65.9 78.6 (**) No n.a. 25.0 n.a.
Tonga 100,000 0.819 35.7 17.6 Yes 15.0 27.5 36.2
Tuvalu 11,000 0.583 126 15 No n.a. 21.8 n.a.
Vanuatu 226,000 0.674 30.1 25.1 Yes 12.5 23.0 27.5
n.a. not applicable 
.. not available 
(*) Grants include civil servants’ wages paid by France, which feed the tax base and so create a kind of double 
account.  
(**) Simple average MFN applied: 4.9 per cent for Papua New Guinea; 9.9 per cent for Solomon Islands. 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from Comptes Economiques Rapides de l’Outre-Mer (CEROM), 
2008. Les défis de la croissance calédonienne; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009. Human 
Development Report 2007–08, United Nations Development Programme, New York; doingbusiness.org; 
official web sites of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Australian Government and the New Zealand 
Government; Kaufman, U., 2009. ‘Pacific trade liberalisation and tariff revenues’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
24(3):173–82); World Trade Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (WTO and 
UNCTAD), 2009. World Tariff Profiles 2009, WTO Publications, World Trade Organization, Washington, DC. 
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